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The  paper  develops  a  dynamic  theoretical  model  and  presents  empirical 
evidence about the relationship between violence and education investments. 
Although some papers have estimated regressions to link educational outcomes 
and violence, no formal models have been developed yet. A theoretical model is 
crucial  to  understand  the  different  channels  through  which  violence  affects 
education. Three channels are identified. First, violence can affect directly the 
utility of households and, therefore, it may modify the consumption of education. 
Second, extreme violence can destroy physical capital and create uncertainty, 
which  will  lower  investment  and  production.  In  the  long  run,  destruction  of 
physical assets and drop in investment impact the income of households who in 
turn  must  reduce  consumption  and  cutback  investments  in  education.  Third, 
violence can modify the rates of return of education, and therefore, can change 
the investment on education. We find violence indeed exerts a toll on education. 
School enrollment is less in Colombian municipalities with homicide rates above 
the national median. Moreover, the likelihood of school enrollment decreases as 
homicide rates rise for all group ages. The impact of homicide rates is larger 
than  transferences  from  the  national  government  to  the  local  government 
earmarked for investment in education and health. 
 
JEL classification: I21, D11, H56 
Key words: Theory of Education, Violence, Colombia, Empirical estimation 
                                            
* The authors acknowledge funding from the Ford Foundation, Grant 1035-0237, to develop this 
research. María Virginia Jordán provided excellent research assistance.  
‡ Felipe Barrera is research associate of Fedesarrollo. fbarrera@fedesarrollo.org.co 
**  Ana  María  Ibáñez  was  research  associate  of  Fedesarrollo  when  this  research  started. 
aibanez@uniandes.edu.co 
DOCUMENTO CEDE 2004-27 
ISSN 1657-7191 (Edición Electrónica) 
JULIO DE 2004 
 
CEDE ¿REDUCE LA VIOLENCIA LA INVERSIÓN EN EDUCACIÓN?: 







Este  artículo  desarrolla  un  modelo  teórico  dinámico  y  presenta  evidencia 
empírica  acerca  de  la  relación  entre  violencia  y  acumulación  de  capital 
humano. La literatura económica tiene artículos que estiman la relación entre 
violencia y educación, sin embargo, no se ha desarrollado un modelo formal en 
la literatura que identifique los canales por medio de los cuales la  violencia 
incide en la educación. El artículo identifica tres de ellos. En primer lugar, la 
violencia  afecta  directamente  las  decisiones  de  inversión  en  educación  al 
afectar  la  utilidad  de  los  hogares.  En  segundo  lugar,  la  violencia  destruye 
directamente los medios de producción y genera incertidumbre, lo cual reduce 
la inversión y el ingreso de los hogares. Por ende, la inversión en educación de 
los hogares puede disminuir. Finalmente, la violencia afecta los retornos de la 
educación lo cual modifica, a su vez, el consumo en educación.  
 
La evidencia encontrada muestra que la violencia induce a una reducción en la 
acumulación de capital humano. La asistencia educativa es menor en aquellos 
municipios Colombianos en los cuales la tasa de homicidios es mayor que la 
mediana nacional. La probabilidad de asistencia educativa en colegios decrece 
a medida que la tasa de homicidios aumenta para todos los grupos de edades. 
El  impacto  de  la  tasa  de  homicidios  es  mayor  que  el  impacto  de  las 
transferencias para educación del Gobierno Nacional a los Gobiernos Locales. 
 
Clasificación JEL: I21, D11, H56 
 


















 1.  Introduction 
Violence may erode investments in human capital. Societies in crime intense 
environments may experience contractions in supply and demand of education.  
Delinquent  activities  damage  infrastructure  and  increase  labor  costs  of 
education limiting, as a consequence, supply of education. On the other hand, 
the  income  of  households  falls  because  crime  destroys  stocks  of  physical 
capital and deters investment. Moreover, families well being decline and returns 
to education may drop. Investments in human capital, therefore, may diminish. 
Deterioration of  human  capital  stocks  caused  by  violence  may  impose  large 
losses to society. Education promotes economic growth and help individuals 
overcome poverty. Recouping lags in investment may take decades.  
This  paper  seeks  to address  two  issues.  First,  the  paper  develops  a formal 
dynamic  model  to  link  violence  and  education.  Although  some  papers  have 
estimated  regressions  to  link  educational  outcomes  and  violence,  no  formal 
models have been developed yet. A theoretical model is crucial to understand 
the different channels through which violence affects education.  Second, we 
estimate the impact of violence on school enrollment using a cross-sectional 
survey  for  Colombia.  Estimations  will  provide  evidence  on  the  impact  of 
violence on education and will contribute to assess the costs of violence.  
We find violence indeed exerts a toll on education. School enrollment is less in 
Colombian  municipalities  with  homicide  rates  above  the  national  median. 
Moreover, the likelihood of school enrollment decreases as homicide rates rise 
for all age groups. The impact of homicide rates is larger than transferences 
from  the  National  Government  to  the  Local  Government  earmarked  for 
investment in education and health.  
The paper is organized as follow. Section II reviews the human capital literature 
and describes some contributions of the economics literature to estimate the 
costs of violence. A dynamic model to understand investment in education in a 
violent environment is presented in Section III. Section IV describes the data 
used and discusses econometric results. Finally, Section V concludes.  2.  Literature review 
a. The influence of violence on education decisions.  
When  deciding  investments  on  human  capital,  households  compare  benefits 
and costs to optimize their economic well-being (Becker, 1964). Benefits arise 
from private returns to education, mainly earnings on the labor market, and non-
monetary benefits such as reductions in child mortality, improvements in birth 
control and a better health, among many others. On the other hand, monetary 
expenses and the opportunity costs from not engaging on earning activities are 
the main components of the costs of education.  
After  Becker’s  seminal  contribution,  the  literature  on  human  capital  has 
developed prolifically. On the empirical context, three strands have emerged. 
The  first  strand  examines  family  investments  on  human  capital  and  its 
subsequent private returns based on earning functions and longitudinal surveys 
(for a detailed review see Schultz, 1988). The second strand utilizes educational 
production functions to identify the inputs that determine the quality of education 
(see  Burtless,  1996;  Angrist  and  Levy,  1999;  Hanushek et  al, 2001).  Lastly, 
studies  analyzing  human  capital  in  developing  countries  evaluate  the  socio-
economic  factors  inducing  school  attendance  (see  Knaul  and  Parker,  1998; 
Ravallion and Wodon, 1998; Sosa and Marchionni, 1999). 
Studies  of  educational  achievement  and  school  attendance  have  focused 
largely  on  individual  and  household  influences.  Yet  lately  geographical  and 
context  variables  have  emerged  as  important  determinants  as  well  (Long  y 
Toma,  1988;  Galenson,  1995;  Ravallion  and  Woodon,1998;  Rephann,  J.T, 
2002).  Geographical and context variables may indicate supply constraints, the 
costs of obtaining education as well as employment opportunities (Rephann, 
2002) and, therefore, may shape human capital investments.  
Violence and crime, two local-specific context variables, have been somehow 
ignored by the economic literature. However, a violent context can erode human 
capital investments by reducing households’ utility, depressing private returns 
from education, limiting educational supply and decreasing household income.  Moreover, countries facing long-standing civil wars may seriously experience 
deteriorations of human capital that may lead to lower economic growth and to 
perpetuation of poverty. 
Violence  can  create  a  climate  of  anxiety  that  directly  affects  the  utility  and, 
therefore,  the  behavior  of  households.  Crime  obliges  individuals  to  be 
constantly alert and adopt defensive strategies. Families living in violent areas 
overprotect  their  children  and  restrict  their  liberty  to  avoid  victimization. 
Moreover, victims of crime and violence confront post-traumatic syndrome. A 
lower utility may oblige households to redistribute spending in order to keep 
utility constant. Consumption in goods that provide immediate satisfaction may 
increase and spending in education, which profits are not foreseeable in the 
near, may diminish.  
Extreme violence, such as civil wars or terrorism, can destroy physical capital 
and  deter  investment.  Examples  of  destruction  of  physical  capital  as  a 
consequence  of  armed  conflicts  and  terrorism  abound.  Guerrilla  groups  in 
Colombia  damage  oil  pipelines,  Al-Qaeda  clashed  airplanes  in  the  financial 
center  of  the  United  States  and  ETA  in  Spain  uses  car  bombs  to  destroy 
factories in the Vasque Region. Violence also creates uncertainty and deters 
investment.  In  the  long  run,  destruction  of  physical  assets  and  drops  in 
investment  impact  the  income  of  households  who  in  turn  must  reduce 
consumption.  Gaviria  (2000)  finds  in  Colombia  investments  in  education  are 
cutback to compensate income shortages.  
When violence deteriorates stocks of physical capital and human and physical 
capital are complements, private returns to education fall. Declines in capital 
stocks  imply  a  slowdown  in  economic  activities,  a  drop  in  the  demand  for 
educated individuals and, as a result, private returns to education decrease. On 
the other hand, since investments in human capital diminish as a consequence 
of violence, the stock of educated individuals drops as well. If this drop exceeds 
reductions  in  the  demand  for  educated  individuals,  returns  to  education 
increase.  Violence may also limit supply of education. Acute episodes of violence can 
cause destruction of physical infrastructure (e.g. schools, buses, libraries) that 
are crucial inputs to “produce” education. In addition, teachers may, on the one 
hand, elude posts in cities or towns with severe crime rates or, on the other 
hand, charge higher salaries to teach in violent neighborhoods (Grogger, 1997).  
Despite the presumably large impact violence imposes on education, economic 
research on this topic is practically non-existent.  A notable exception is the 
study by Grogger (1997) that examines violence inside school as determinants 
of educational outcomes and teacher salaries.  On the other hand, sociologists 
and  psychologist  have  analyzed  the  link  between  violence  and  educational 
outcomes  in  extent  (see  Simcha-Fagan  and  Schwartz,  1986;  Lab  and 
Whitehead, 1992; Bowen et al, 2002).  
The economic literature has not developed yet theoretical models clarifying how 
violence  affects  households’  decision  to  invest  on  education.  Moreover, 
empirical  papers  only  concentrate  on  violence  inside  schools  and  do  not 
examine the effect of city and country-wise violence. In addition, these papers 
rely on subjective empirical measures of crime and violence.  The purpose of 
this  paper  is  to  fill  these  gaps  by  developing  a  theoretical  model  linking 
investments in human capital and violence and by providing empirical evidence.  
b. The costs of violence 
Violence imposes social and economic costs to society. Costs of crime largely 
originate from reductions in economic activities, deviations of public and private 
funds from other purposes (e.g. education and health) to curtail violence and 
increments  in  welfare  losses  to  households.  The  economic  literature  has 
concentrated mainly on estimating costs from slow down of economic activities 
as well as calculating public resources allotted to cut back crime.  
Estimates of the costs of crime are mainly aggregated figures. Total economic 
losses to victims of crime, including medical costs and lost work time, during 
1992 in the United States were measured in $532 per crime and 17.6 billion for 
all reported crimes that year; this is equivalent to 0.3% of GDP (Klaus, 1994). Miller et. al. (1996) estimate losses from personal crime in the United States are 
$105  billion  and  include  medical  costs,  lost  earnings  and  public  programs 
related to victim assistance. When pain, suffering and the reduced quality of life 
are incorporated, costs raise to an estimated $450 billion annually. Londoño 
(1998) calculates human capital losses in Colombia originating from violence 
around  4%  of  GDP  each  year.  Rubio  (1997)  approximates  total  household 
expenditures on protection and security amount to 1.4% of the Colombian GDP. 
Welfare losses to households have been largely ignored despite the big burden 
they might be imposing. Families confront pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs 
from being victimized (Freeman, 1999). Victims of crime face monetary costs 
due to property losses, expenditures in medical and health care and legal costs 
associated  with  tort  claims  (Cohen  et  al.,  1994).    Non-pecuniary  losses  are 
presumably larger and stem from three sources. First, quality of life decreases 
because  households  have  to  cope  with  the  reduced  sense  of  personal  and 
proprietary  security  (Fajnzylber,  1998).  Second,  households  must  reallocate 
budget in order to adopt preventive strategies, like hiring private guards and 
installing anti-theft devices. Third, households modify their behavior in order to 
prevent victimization. For example, students of night schools quit for security 
reasons  (Cuéllar,  2000),  people  avoid  road  trips  and  do  not  go  out  at  night 
(Gaviria and Vélez, 2001) and households have to seek refuge in other cities or 
countries (Kirchhoff and Ibáñez, 2001). 
Estimates of non-pecuniary losses and evidence on behavioral responses are 
difficult to find. Levitt (1995) calculates the cost of pain, suffering and economic 
loss for the average crime around $3.000. Ibáñez and Vélez (2003) find welfare 
losses from forced displacement in Colombia are 25 percent of the net present 
value of aggregated consumption of the average household. The propensity of 
Colombian households to engage in anti-crime strategies is analyzed in Gaviria 
and Vélez (2001). Surveys applied to a representative sample of the Colombian 
urban population show more than 80 percent of respondents do not go out at 
night, 36 percent participate in neighborhood watching services, 21 percent hire 
private guards and 25 percent avoid road trips for fear crime.  Does crime and violence deter investment on human capital? The purpose of 
this paper is to provide evidence on behavioral responses to violence and crime 
activities. Namely, the paper seeks to address whether violence in Colombia 
modifies  investments  in  education.  By  providing  empirical  evidence  about 
behavioral  responses  to  crime,  the  paper  contributes  to  understand  the 
economic losses of violence.  
III. Education and Violence: A Simple Dynamic Model 
Violence  influence  decisions  of  education  investments  through  several 
channels. The income of the family and the community fall affecting in turn the 
household’s  budget  constraint;  returns  of  education  change  due  to  violence; 
and violence impacts directly the well being of household. The purpose of this 
model
1 is to show some of the potential links between violence and the decision 
of household’s education, as well as to present a formal framework in which the 
relationship is explicitly modeled. 
3.1 The model 
a.  Channels between violence and educational decisions 
We  consider  three  main  channels  of  relationship  between  violence  and 
education. Violence directly affects the utility of the individual ( (.) u ); it lowers 
the income of the parents (
p y ); and it modifies the returns to education (B ). 
Violence directly affects the utility of individuals  
We assume that violence can reduce directly the well being of individuals. In 
mathematical terms this is represented by the following relationship:   
) , ( j j v c u  where 0 / > ¶ ¶ c u and 0 / < ¶ ¶ v u  for  1 + = t and t j          (1) 
                                            
1 The model builds upon the model of Barrera (2001) by including violence as a component that 
affects decisions of the individuals. The utility of the individual increases with consumption (c) and decreases with 
violence.
2 One critical assumption in the model is that violence ( t v ), from the 
standpoint of view of the family, is given. The family “receives” certain amount 
of  violence  and  makes  decisions  based  on  the  observed  level  of  violence. 
Violence may affect directly the utility function because it creates fear, or other 
“states”, that decreases the well being of individuals. As it is described on other 
papers, one of the objectives of violence is to create a state of fear in order to, 
for instance, assure the functioning of illegal business (Gambetta (1993))  
Violence affects income of parents 
The  effect  of  violence  over  income  is  explained  by  two  mechanisms.  First, 
violence  can  directly  destroy  physical  capacity.  Second,  violence  creates 
uncertainty,  and  therefore,  lowers  investment.  In  synthesis,  these  two 
mechanisms translate in the following mathematical expression:    
) ( t
p p v y y = where  0 / < ¶ ¶ v y
p                 (2) 
The  expression  indicates  that  the  income  of  parents  depends  negatively  on 
violence. Violence can destroy directly the production activities of individuals. 
Terrorist  attacks  to  towns  are  quite  destructive  of  houses,  shops,  and 
infrastructure. Also, a town under the potential attack of illegal groups will see a 
reduction of investment, and therefore, lower production.    
Violence affects returns to education 
The effect of violence in the returns of education is twofold. As long as violence 
reduces the level of investment and the capacity of production, and assuming 
complementarities  between  deepening  of  physical  capital  and  higher  human 
capital, the returns of education diminish with violence. However, violence may 
create  a  “stock  effect”  that  induces  increments  in  returns  of  education:  if 
violence  decreases  education,  let  say  at  period  t,  the  returns  of  education 
                                            
2 Properties of concavity are assumed in order to reach a unique maximum.  increase in period  1 + t . Thus, in  1 + t , investment in education increases. The 
net effect of violence over returns to education is therefore ambiguous: 
   ) , ( v B B h =    where    0 / >< ¶ ¶ v B
3                                              (3) 
The  net  effect  over  investment  in  education  (the  increment  in  1 + t   and  the 
decline in t) can be positive or negative. 
In conclusion, Equations (1) to (3) show the key main channels of the effect of 
violence over education. Equation (1) presents the direct effect of violence over 
the well being of individuals; Equation (2) presents the effects of violence over 
the income of parents; and Equation (3) establishes that returns to education 
depend on the stock effect and reductions in demand for educated individuals.  
3.2  Household decision 
Individuals  make  decisions  in  two  periods.  In  the  first  one  they  decide  the 
amount of  consumption  ( t c ),  the  decision  of  whether  to  invest  on  education 
(E , 0 = E or 1 = E ) and the quantity of the education ( t q ): The individual receives 
income from his parents (
p y ). In the second period, the individual (inelastically) 
works and decides the optimal amount of consumption ( 1 + t c ). 
The  budget  constraint  of  the  individual  for  period  t  is  t t t t
p q E p c v y * * ) ( + =  
(where  t p  is the price of education), whereas the constraint for period  1 + t  is 
1 1 * * ) , ( + + = t t t c q E v B h .  The  first  one  states  that  the  individual  consumes  and 
attends to school payed by his parents. The second constraint establishes that 
                                            
3 The variableh  captures “ability”, a characteristic unobservable to the researcher. the individual receives an income that is determined by the returns to education 
and consumes  1 + t c .
4  
Implicitly, we assume that the provider of education is the Government, and 
therefore,  t p  does not reflect the enrollment fees, but other cost associated with 
education (books, uniforms, etc) In general, the price of education ( t p ), when it 
includes all the cost of education can increase with violence. Indeed, it is more 
costly for the Colombian Government to provide education in an area with acute 
violence.  For  instance,  the  implicit  opportunity  cost  of  teachers  increases  in 
these types of zones. Presumably, the higher cost would impact the price of 
providing education. We did not include this mechanism in the model because 
the majority of individuals in areas of acute violence attend public schools. For 
this reason, prices are given and the effect of violence does not translate onto 
educational prices. In a model of demand and supply, however, this effect may 
be important.  
The solution of the problem is by backward induction. In any path of education 
( 0 = E or 1 = E ) the individual choose optimally the consumption and the quantity 
of education. Given the optimal decision over these variables, the optimalE  will 
be given by the path that yields the highest utility.  
The problem of the agent when 1 = E  is, therefore
5,  
)] * * ( ) , ( [ )] * * ( ) , ( [ max 1 1 1 1
, , 1
+ + + + - + + - - +
+
t t t t t t t t
p
t t t
q c c c q E B v c u q E p c y v c u
t t t
l b l         
For positive values of qand c, the solution of this dynamic problem is given by 
the Euler Equation  
                                            
4 Implicitly we assume perfect foresight in that individuals knows, at t , the returns of education 
in  1 + t . 
5 One assumption of the model is perfect foresight, and therefore, uncertainty is not explicitly 
model.  However,  this  assumption  can  be  easily  incorporated  with  a  maximization  of  the 
expected function, with violence following a stochastic process.  However, results do not vary 
greatly.  ) , ( * ) / ) , ( ( * ) / ) , ( ( 1 1 1 1 + + + + ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ t t t t t t t t v B c v c u p c v c u h b       (4) 
and the two budget constrains. The Euler Equation states that the marginal cost 
of education in the first period has to be equal to the marginal benefit of it at the 
optimum.  
From this equation, the optimal demand for  cand  qare derived. Specifically, 
) , ), ( ), , ( , , ( 1 1
*
+ + = t t t
p
t t t v v v y v B p q q h b    (5) 
Equation  (5)  gives  the  fundamental  relationship  between  education  and 


























































* * * *               (6) 
The  last  assumption  simplifies  the  analysis  and  allows  us  to  present  in  one 
equation the total effect of violence over education. Although it is possible to 
incorporate separately the effect of  t v  and  1 + t v  over 
* q , it does not add much to 
the analysis and complicates matters unnecessarily. Moreover, several articles 
present evidence about the positive correlation inter-temporal violence
6.  
Equation (6) can be positive or negative. On one hand, the first three derivatives 
are negative: violence decreases utility ( 0 / < ¶ ¶ t v q  and  0 / 1 < ¶ ¶ + t v q ) and also 
decreases the income of the family ( 0 / < ¶ ¶ v y
p ). On the other hand, violence 
can  have  a  positive  or  negative  effect  over  returns.  If  violence  induces  a 
negative effect over returns ( 0 / < ¶ ¶ v B ), the sign is unequivocally negative. If 
violence has a positive effect over returns ( 0 / > ¶ ¶ v B ), expression (6) can be 
positive.  
Equation (4) does not provide, however, an equilibrium since the decision of 
0 = E  is an option. When  0 = E , the problem of the individual is  
                                            
6 For instance, Sánchez et. al. (2003) or Barrera(2004) )] ( ) , ( [ )] ( ) , ( [ max 1 1 1 1
, 1
+ + + + - + + - +
+
t t t t t
p
t t t
c c c y v c u c y v c u
t t
l b l  
where y is the income that the individual perceive in period  1 + t  if he does not 
have any education. The solution is given by the analogous to Equation (4): 
1 1 1 / ) , ( / ) , ( + + + ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ t t t t t t c v c u c v c u b           (7) 
In order to find whether  0 = E or 1 = E , we need to compare the utility realized in 
both  paths  of  decisions  of  education.  Therefore,  1 = E   will  be  an  optimal 



















j j v c u v c u                  (8) 
The “participation” equation (8) is critical, and it comprises the second relevant 
relationship between education and violence. First, violence affects both sides 
of  the  inequality  via  lowering  utility.  Second,  violence  affects  the  returns  of 
education and therefore it makes more difficult (easier) to fulfill equation (8) if 
the effect is negative (positive). Finally, violence lowers the income of parents, 
which in turn will induce a more binding budget constraint and a lower value of 
the left hand side of this equation. 
It is important to stress several assumptions of the model. As stated above, the 
separation between public and private education is a critical one. In this model 
we assume that education is publicly provided, and therefore, individuals face 
“free” education. This assumption is not far-fetched for acute violence zones 
where public education is the norm.  
Another important assumption is the lack of migration. Migration of individuals 
due  to  violence  is  an  important  phenomenon  in  Colombia  (see  Ibáñez  and 
Velez (2003)). In the model, we do not incorporate this behavioral response to 
violence  and  this  limits  our  results.  Theoretically,  it  is  possible  that  a  family 
migrates from a rural area in which provision of services is limited to a city in 
which supply of education is higher.    IV. Empirical Estimations  
4.1  The Data 
The  primary  sources  of  data  we  used  to  analyze  the  impact  of  violence  on 
education  are  the  Living Standards  Measurement  Survey  (LSMS-97)  applied 
during 1997 in Colombia and the Municipal Violence Data (MVD). The LSMS-97 
sample is representative of the Colombian Population and its eight regions. The 
sample contains information for 9,121 households and 38,518 individuals. The 
questionnaires that were administered to these households elicited information 
about  socio-demographic  characteristics  of  each  household  member,  school 
attendance, health status and household spending. Information on household 
victimization during the last six months and access to public and social services 
was also collected. 
The MVD was collected by the authors based on information from the Ministry 
of Defense, the Colombian Police and the Department of National Planning. 
The MVD contains yearly information at the municipal level
7 for occurrence of 
violent events during the period 1993-2000.  Violent events included in the MVD 
are homicides rates, terrorist attacks, massacres and kidnapping.  
The  origins  of  current  violence  in  Colombia  are diverse.    During  the  last 40 
years Colombia has faced a long-standing civil war. In addition, illegal drug-
trafficking soared since the 1980s and, as a consequence, illegal activities and 
crime flourished. Lastly, the erosion of the Judicial System, provoked mainly by 
drug-trafficking,  created  favorable  conditions  for  crime  development 
(Montenegro and Posada, 2001).  
Violence in Colombia is widespread. While urban areas are mostly affected by 
crime-related activities, the civil war takes place typically in the rural areas of 
the country. Figure 1 shows the trend of homicides rates from 1946 to 2000. 
During  the  sixties  and  most  of  the  seventies,  homicide  rates  did  not  exhibit 
major fluctuations and in the late seventies escalated dramatically tripling by 
                                            
7 Municipalities are the smallest administrative unit in Colombia.  1990. Although violence covers most of the Colombian territory, homicide rates 
reached  epidemic  proportions  in  large  cities  (Gaviria  and  Vélez,  2001).  In 
contrast,  massacres,  armed  confrontations  and  forced  displacement  are 
predominant violent events in rural areas. Since 1995, near four percent of the 
Colombian population
8 have fled their town to seek refuge from war.  






























































Source: Colombian National Police 
What  is  the  evolution  of  school  enrollment  in  Colombia?  During  the  period 
ranging from 1978 to 1995, school enrollment rates grew steadily in urban areas 
and  registered  significant  gains  in  rural  areas  (see  Table  1).  Educational 
attainment increased by 2.7 years in urban areas and doubled in rural areas. As 
a  result,  the  urban-rural  gap  narrowed  significantly.  Increases  in  school 
enrollment came along with less inequality (Vélez, 2002).  
                                            
8 This is approximately 1.3 million people. Table 1. School Enrollment: Urban and Rural Areas 
  1978  1988  1995  1999 
School enrollment – Urban areas         
Ages 7 to 11  91.8%  94.8%  96.5%  95.3% 
Ages 12 to 17  76.9%  80.5%  84.4%  82.2% 
Ages 18-22  31.2%  35.8%  41.0%  36.3% 
School enrollment – Rural areas         
Ages 7 to 11  66.2%  85.4%  90.1%  90.5% 
Ages 12 to 17  43.5%  57.2%  63.7%  66.0% 
Ages 18-22  9.0%  14.6%  19.2%  20.6% 
Source: World Bank (2002) 
 
Evidence  about  the  effect  of  widespread  violence  on  school  enrollment  is 
ambiguous. Table 2 shows school enrollment rates for municipalities below and 
above the national median of homicides rates in 1997.  When all the Colombian 
municipalities are included, divergences in school enrollment between violent 
and  non-violent  municipalities  are  not  statistically  significant.  However,  large 
cities  exhibit  two  different  behaviors  in  contrast  from  all  Colombian 
municipalities and this might be driving the inconclusive results. First, violence 
in large cities is well above the national median. Second, investments to expand 
educational coverage were considerably greater in these cities. Therefore, large 
cities  experienced  unprecedented  increments  in  homicide  rates  parallel  to 
substantial  expansions  in  access  to  education.  If  the  four  larger  cities  are 
dropped, school enrollments are higher in municipalities facing homicide rates 
below the national median. The difference is statistically significant and widens 
for older children and young adults.  
Table 2. School Enrollment for Municipalities Below and Above the 
National Median of Homicide Rates 
  Below the 
median 
Above the median 
School enrollment for total sample     
Ages 7-11  92.96  92.61 
Ages 12-17  75.92  76.75 
Ages 18-22  31.75  34.63 
School enrollment for sample without four largest cities 
1     
Ages 7-11  92.96  90.37 
Ages 12-17  75.92  72.64 
Ages 18-22  31.75  27.27 
Source: Authors calculations based on LSMS-97 and MVD 
1. The four largest cities are Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla and Cali 
The evidence about the impact of violence on education is mixed. However, it 
necessary to control for other municipal conditions as well as household and 
individual characteristics to uncover the determinants of school enrollment. The next  section  estimates  probit  models  of  school  enrollment  to  identify  such 
determinants  and  clarify  whether  violence  affects  school  enrollment  in 
Colombia.  
4.2. The Determinants of School Enrollment 
To examine the determinants of school enrollment, two groups of probit models 
were estimated. The first group estimates the probability of school enrollment 
depending  only  on  household  and  individual  variables.  School  enrollment  is 
estimated for children between 7 and 11 years, 12 and 18 years as well as 
young adults between 18 and 22 years of age. The second group of regressions 
includes  context  and  geographic  variables  as  determinants  of  school 
enrollment.  
Table 3 provides estimates of the probability of school enrollment when only 
household and individual influences are considered. Results are consistent with 
findings of similar papers. Male children are less likely to enroll in school. The 
probability  of  attending  school  is  greater  for  children  from  male  headed 
households with better educated or wealthier parents. School enrollment is less 
for children with working mothers. Lastly, residing in urban regions increases 
the likelihood of school attendance.  
Table  4.  Probability  of  School  Enrollment  –  Household  and  Individual                
Characteristics       
   Ages 7-11  Ages 12-17  Ages 18-22 
Variable  dF/dx  P>|z|  dF/dx  P>|z|  dF/dx  P>|z| 
Male  -0.0255  0.00  -0.0304  0.00  -0.0274  0.00 
Male household head  0.0058  0.00  0.0083  0.00  -0.0054  0.00 
Years of schooling – More educated parent  0.0095  0.00  0.0304  0.00  0.0293  0.00 
Yearly per capita aggregate consumption  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Working mother  -0.0235  0.00  -0.1481  0.00  -0.1572  0.00 
Urban region  0.0159  0.00  0.119  0.00  0.1079  0.00 
Pseudo R-square  0.1458  0.1367  0.1216 
Source: Authors calculations based on LSMS-97 
Inclusion of homicide rates and other context specific variable does not alter 
results  yet  it  provides  interesting  insights.  Violence  has  indeed  a  negative 
impact on school enrollment for all age groups in particular for young adults. 
This may imply that reductions in utility, households’ income and returns from education  stemming  from  violence  outweigh  increments  in  private  returns 
caused by shortages in supply of educated individuals.  
All other context variables have a significant influence on school enrollments. 
Transfers from the National Government to Local Governments
9 are effective to 
increase  educational  coverage.  In  stark  contrast,  the  size  of  the  educational 
staff in the municipalities exercises a perverse incentive on school enrollment
10. 
As  educational  staff  increases,  the  likelihood  of  enrollment  diminishes.  
Distance  to  the  state capital,  which  may  reflect  availability  of  school  supply, 
decrease the probability of enrollment for children between 7 and 11 years of 
age, increase school enrollment for children between 12 and 17 years and has 
no effect for young adults.  
The  magnitudes  of  the  marginal  effects  allow  us  to  assess  the  impact  of 
homicide rates on school enrollment. A one percent increase in homicide rates 
drops  school  enrollment  in  greater  proportions  than  an  expansion  of  one 
percent transfers of the National Government. It is worth asking whether cutting 
bade  violence  may  contribute  equally  or  more  to  school  enrollment  that 
transfers of the National Government earmarked for education and health. This 
might be particularly true in countries with acute episodes of violence.  
                                            
9 These transfers are earmarked for local spending on education and health.  
10  Recently,  the  law  allocating  public  spending  to  education  was  modified.  Now,  education 
spending  depends  on  the  number  of  children  enrolled.  The  previous  law  had  perverse 
incentives and teachers seeked assignments in municipalities with low enrollment rates. 
 Table 5. Probability of School Enrollment – Household, Individual and 
Municipal Characteristics 
   Ages 7-11  Ages 12-17  Ages 18-22 
Variable  dF/dx  P>|z|  dF/dx  P>|z|  dF/dx  P>|z| 
Male  -0.0210  0.00  -0.0313  0.00  -0.0320  0.00 
Male household head  0.0099  0.00  0.0079  0.00  0.0148  0.00 
Years of schooling – More educated parent  0.0077  0.00  0.0320  0.00  0.0331  0.00 
Yearly per capita aggregate consumption  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00 
Working mother  -0.0297  0.00  -0.1638  0.00  -0.1568  0.00 
Urban region  0.0220  0.00  0.1416  0.00  0.1100  0.00 
Homicide rates  -0.0002  0.00  -0.0001  0.00  -0.0003  0.00 
Transfers from National Government p.c  0.0000  0.00  0.0001  0.00  -0.0001  0.00 
Size of educational staff at the municipality  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.00 
Distance to state capital  -0.0001  0.00  0.0000  0.00  0.0000  0.11 
Pseudo R-square  0.1562  0.1482  0.1336 
Source: Authors calculations based on LSMS-97 
Violence in Colombia appears to erode investments in human capital. School 
enrollment  is  less  frequent  in  municipalities  with  homicide  rates  below  the 
national median. In addition, after controlling for individual, household and other 
context variables, violence influences negatively school enrollment. The costs of 
violence in this respect can be sizeable because deterioration of human capital 
is difficult to recoup in the long run.  Conclusions 
Results  of  this  paper  show  deterioration  of  human  capital  stocks  is  another 
economic cost of violence. As the theoretical model indicates, families reduce 
investments  in  education  when  confronted  to  violence  because  utility 
decreases, household income contracts and returns to education may shrink. 
But not only the “quantity” of education diminishes. Households may decide not 
to invest on education at all and the quality of education may also suffer due to 
destruction of infrastructure and a lower availability of teachers.  
Estimations for Colombia reveal violence reduce investments in human capital. 
School  enrollments  in  violent  municipalities  are  small.  And  the  likelihood  of 
school  enrollment  for  children  between  7-11  years,  12-17  and  young  adults 
between  18-22  decreases  as  homicide  rates  increase.  Violence,  therefore, 
impinges  not  only  monetary  losses  to  households  but  modifies  behavior  in 
perverse ways. To recuperate declines in human capital investments as a result 
of crime may require decades.  References 
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